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Quanglebits and my Hopf Fiber Obsession

By Jennifer Nielsen Labels:

Background: https://ncatlab.org/nlab/show/Hopf+fibration


Project A: Towards defining a unit measure of quantum information, a quanglebit, written as a Hopf bundle over a Bloch hypersphere in complex space, which unlike the qubit is sensitive to quantum entanglement and could contain entanglement information. (There is past work to cite here that goes so far as mentioning the Bloch sphere and qubits and that the Hopf fibration is a way to redo the qubit, but does not redefine a new measure of information -- I think it is crucial at this point to redefine our measure of quantum information and get away from the limitations of the qubit structure, which is not easy to describe entanglement therewith.) Beginning date of project: 2013 (with many breaks). While hardly trivial, not a difficult project. 

Project B: Redefining the fields [EM and QFT] and Schrodinger on the Hopf fiber bundle (approximate beginning date of project: June 2008). 







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